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Introduction 
THECONTINUOUS TENSION BETWEEN bureaucratic values and democratic 
control has been complicated in recent years by the rapid development 
of information technology and by its application to the agencies of 
government. As sophisticated computer and communications equip- 
ment has been introduced into public agencies, so information has 
become far easier to collect, store, manipulate, and disseminate. On the 
one hand, this has enhanced the management, decision-making, and 
analytical capabilities of governmental organizations. However, the 
advantages that contemporary data-processing techniques have 
brought are offset by certain dangers. In particular, the immense capa- 
bility to control vast quantities of personal information on individual 
citizens has generated a worldwide concern about the potential for 
bureaucratic surveillance and about the consequent erosion of personal 
privacy. 
The gradual realization of these dangers over the last twenty years 
has motivated most Western democracies to provide a policy response in 
the form of “privacy” or “data-protection” laws. Data-protection laws 
are confined to that aspect of privacy protection that arises from the 
collection, use, and disclosure of information on identifiable individu- 
als. Przuacy is used here to encapsulate the broad social value ra ther than 
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the specific policy area. Data protection (the European nomenclature, 
translated from the German Datenschutz)is a more accurate title for this 
group of policies whose main purpose is to regulate the collection, 
storage, use, and transmittal of personal data. Hence the Privacy Act, 
strictly speaking, is a data-protection law similar in purpose to those in 
Europe. Data-protection policy satisfies the right to privacy. But that 
right means more than the protection of information, and is advanced 
through many other statutory, judicial, and constitutional means. 
All national legislation is based on a strikingly similar set of “fair 
information principles” designed to minimize intrusiveness in the col- 
lection of personal information; to maximize fairness in its use; and to 
provide reasonable and enforceable expectations of confidentiality with 
regard to its transmittal. The major data-protection legislation at the 
federal level in the United States, and the main focus of this article, is the 
Privacy Act of 1974.’ 
So far, neither the personal data-protection question in general, 
nor the Privacy Act in particular, have received much attention from 
social scientists. The context of rapid technological change has pro- 
duced a large body of technical, legalistic, and polemical writing that is 
reactive and transient rather than reflective or theoretical. More espe- 
cially, there are few studies of data protection as a policy problem using 
the concepts and approaches of political science. Consequently, policy 
advocacy has progressed without a clear understanding of the tractabil- 
ity of the problem, and of the behavioral and structural variables that 
might impede effective policy implementation. 
The aim of this article is to examine personal data protection as a 
policy problem, employing concepts and approaches from the field of 
political science. This task involves: (1) an analysis of issue emergence 
and problem definition; (2) a study of policy formation; (3) an assess- 
ment of oversight and enforcement; and (4) an identification of the 
various conceptual, structural, and motivational factors that have pre- 
vented data protection from becoming a fully effective component of 
American national information policy. The article concludes by dis- 
cussing the prospects for American data-protection policy given the ten 
years’ experience of implementing the Privacy Act. 
It should be noted, however, that other constitutional, common 
law, and statutory controls play a role in national privacy policy. The 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments all limit government intrusive- 
ness in a variety of ways and thus pertain to the subject of privacy. 
Certain recently enacted statutes include specific safeguards for certain 
types of data: the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (credit reports); the 
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Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (education records); 
the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (tax information); the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978 (private financial records); and the Privacy Protec- 
tion Act of 1980 (press offices and files). The Brooks Act of 1965, the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, and the Federal Managers’ Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982 established federal agency roles for managing 
automated systems. In October 1984, Congress enacted the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act which imposes 
criminal penalties for certain computer-related crimes. All states also 
now have a variety of privacy laws for both public and private sectors. 
While we do not address state law here, it should be noted that the 
protections afforded at the state level are becoming increasingly 
extensive. 
However, while U.S. privacy law is derived from a variety of 
sources, the centerpiece remains the Privacy Act of 1974. The experience 
of this legislation exposes the major problems of implementing per- 
sonal data-protection policy and of trying to protect personal informa- 
tion in a climate of rapid technological change and competing 
information values. Further, to the American, government (rather than 
the private sector) has always been regarded as the major threat to 
privacy rights. Unlike in most European countries, the private sector 
remains largely unregulated at the federal level. There are some statu- 
tory controls mainly related to credit, banking, and insurance records. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission recommended the extension 
of controls on a sectoral basis to other record-keeping relationships. 
Overall, however, the private sector in the United States is expected to 
act voluntarily. 
This is not so with the public sector. The fear of information 
technology in the hands of government, as expressed in the Privacy Act, 
reflects a cultural belief that government is the primary potential threat 
and the most likely structure to misuse or abuse the enormous power of 
information technology. In this respect too i t  is fitting to regard the 
Privacy Act as the cornerstone of American privacy policy, the success- 
ful implementation of which is crucial if personal privacy is to play a 
meaningful role in national information policy. 
Problem Definition and Issue Emergence 
There is no generally accepted definition of privacy. A variety of 
cross-cutting values and interests intrude upon its very broadandamor- 
phous range. The classic definition is the “right to be let alone,” 
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originally presented by Judge Cooley and later elaborated in a famous 
article by Warren and Brandeis.’ As the concept developed throughout 
the twentieth century, it became applied to a wide variety of social 
relationships and modes of behavior. In 1960, William Prosser tried to 
clarify the case law and found a complex of four torts: (1)  intrusions 
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude or into his private affairs; 
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts; ( 3 )  publicity that 
places the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) appropriation for the defen- 
dant’s advantage of the plaintiff’s name or l ikenes~.~ As the concept was 
granted constitutional status in 1965, as existing in the “penumbras” of 
the Constitution, so its span and application widened. 4 
Privacy as a problem of public policy, however, really arose with 
the development and spread of computer technology in the 1960s and 
especially with its application to government. Of particular importance 
was the abortive attempt to establish a “National Data Center” of all 
basic statistical data originating in federal agencies. Although this 
center was intended for aggregate statistical analysis and not for admin-
istrative decision-making about individuals, the proposal floundered 
when subjected to Congressional scrutiny. 
Simultaneously, privacy came to be regarded more as a policy 
problem than something that can be protected in the face of rapid 
technological change by case law. The necessity for a more synoptic 
public-policy solution arose “partly because judicial policies and con- 
stitutional interpretation failed to promote legal recognition of and 
protection for individuals’ claims that their right of privacy entails 
safeguards against abuse of personal information collected, maintained 
and utilized by the g~vernment .”~ Henceforth the right to “information 
privacy” was distinguished from other behavioral aspects of privacy 
(such as physical intrusion and surveillance) and granted its own sepa- 
rate distinction as an issue of public policy. 
Two books, Privacy and Freedom,‘ a study commissioned by the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and authored by Alan 
Westin, and Arthur Miller’s The Assault on Privacy’ helped sensitize 
public and elite opinion to the problem and played a critical role in 
defining that problem. For both, information privacy meant givin %individuals “the ability to control the circulation of information” 
relating to them or “to determine for themselves when, how and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to other^."^ Personal 
information emerged from the debates in the late 1960s as ProPerty 
which could not be taken or misused by government without due 
process of law. Later the idea was refined into a set of principlesof “fair 
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information practice” to ensure minimal intrusiveness, maximum fair- 
ness, and legitimate expectations of confidentiality. 
Academic treatments gave way to empirical analyses as concern for 
the issue grew. Westin followed up  his earlier work with a project for the 
National Academy of Sciences entitled Databanks in a Free Society.” In 
addition, a 1973 study entitled Records, Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens” by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Advi- 
sory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems called “attention 
to issues of record-keeping practice in the computer age that may have 
profound significance for us all.” As the then Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare, Caspar Weinberger, wrote in its forward, i t  
represented “the views of an unusual mixture of experts and lawyers.”’’ 
Kingdon, in Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, contends 
that policy is made in America when “the separate streams of problems, 
policies and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions 
become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favorable 
political for~es.”’~ In this case, the “solution” of fair information prac- 
tices became linked to the “problem” of information privacy. Both were 
connected to the “favorable political forces” of Watergate. With its 
many and various cases of political bribery, corruption, malpractice, 
intrusiveness, and abuse of persona1 data, this crisis provided the propi- 
tious climate for the construction of a comprehensive data-protection 
policy. 
Kingdon also suggests that this “coupling of the streams” is often 
facilitated by “policy entrepreneurs” defined as “advocates who are 
willing to invest their resources ....to promote a position in return for 
anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive or solidary 
benefits.”14 In the case of information privacy, the policy entrepreneur 
was Senator Samuel J.  Ervin, Jr. (Democrat, North Carolina), who had 
been a staunch campaigner for protective legislation since the late 
1960s. Ervin’s central role as the chairman of the Senate investigative 
committee which held televised hearings into the Watergate affair, 
enhanced his stature. The passage of the Privacy Act in the final hours of 
the 93rd Congress, therefore, was a solution to a long-standing problem, 
a legislative response to the presidential abuse of power and a personal 
tribute to Ervin in his final term. 
Policy Content 
While privacy invasions in general had been a subject of Congres-
sional interest since the mid-l960s, the idea of legislating a set of fair 
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information principles to protect the right to information privacy was 
motivated principally by the long-term efforts of Senator Samuel J.  
Ervin. In the House, the efforts of then Congressmen Edward I. Koch 
(Democrat, New York) and Barry Goldwater, Jr. (Republican, Califor- 
nia) were instrumental in fostering broad bipartisan agreement on the 
basic content of the law. 
The first principle in the act is that agencies shall not disclose 
personal information contained in a system of records without the 
“prior consent of the individual to whom the record pertain^."'^ There 
are a number of controversial exemptions to this rule. Disclosure is 
permitted without consent to those within the agency who havea “need 
for the record in the performance of their duties”; to other agencies in 
connection with “routine uses,” in other words for purposes “compat- 
ible with the purposes for which it was collected”; and to an agency 
engaged in “civil or criminal law enforcement activity.” Agencies are 
also expected to keep an accurate accounting of all disclosures and 
ensure that corrections made are transmitted “down the line.” 
Second, the Privacy Act requires agencies to allow the individual 
access to “information pertaining to him” which is contained in a 
“system of records.” A very similar right had existed since 1967 in the 
more widely drawn Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Unlike FOIA, 
however, the Privacy Act grants the individual the concomitant right to 
correct any portion of that record which is not “accurate, relevant, 
timely or 
The third principle concerns collection limitation. Agencies 
should only maintain those records that are “relevant and necessary to 
accomplish the purpose of the agency.”17 Records should be composed 
of information gleaned “to the greatest extent practicable directly from 
the subject individual.” Data subjects should be informed of the author- 
ity for collection, the agencies to which the information may be trans- 
mitted, and the “routine uses” to which the information may be put. 
Fourth, record systems should be public. Agencies are required to 
publish in the Federal Register at least once a year a notice of the 
existence and nature of each system of records containing details of the 
categories of individuals maintained therein, the type of information 
stored, and the practices of the agency regarding storage, retrievability, 
access, retention, and disposal. These systems notices arealso sent to the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress for review. 
The Privacy Act (unlike some of its European equivalents) applies 
to both manual and automated record-keeping systems and provides for 
both civil remedies and criminal penalties in the event of violation. It 
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was hoped that the implementation of these principles would restore 
the correct balance between the citizen and the record-keeping agency. 
To the extent that an American data-protection policy existed, i t  was 
reflected in a general consensus among privacy advocates that the 
dangers of information technology to individual rights could be min- 
imized by the implementation of these principles by the federal agen- 
cies. A balance could be struck between the legitimate information 
needs of government and the constitutionally recognized privacy rights 
of the citizen. 
The major controversy centered not on questions of principle but 
on methods of implementation. From an early stage in the debate, 
privacy advocates agreed that the most effective way to establish fair 
information practice would be through an independent commission. 
Advocates differed, however, over the size of such a body and over 
whether it should be granted the authority to enforce its regulations 
(thus making it in effect a regulatory body). As Regandemonstrates, the 
question of implementation came to dominate the policy discussions 
during which bureaucratic interests in maintaining maximum auto- 
nomy over personal information systems surfaced and eventually pre- 
vailed. This exposes the dilemma of trying to decide implementation 
questions during policy formation: “When implementation questions 
are left unresolved in policy design, bureaucratic concerns will domi- 
nate the implementation stage, but when implementation questions are 
resolved in policy design, bureaucratic concerns will dominate the 
formulation 
Arguments about the need for an independent agency centered on 
the primary Senate bill” introduced by Senator Ervin. Incontrast to the 
House bill:’ Ervin’s bill provided for a Federal Privacy Board with 
oversight and advisory responsibilities. A number of pressing factors 
forced Ervin to abandon this notion in the final days of the 93rd 
Congress: irreconcilable differences between House and Senate under 
severe time pressures; the overwhelming desire to provide some legisla- 
tive response (however imperfect or symbolic) to the Watergate scandal; 
and the fear of a presidential veto if the bill contained provision for an 
independent and permanent privacy commission. 
This backdown resulted in two compromises. First the Federal 
Privacy Board was transformed into a Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission (PPSC) to investigate the issue and make recommendations to 
the president and Congress for action. The commission was given 
subpoena power and the power to swear witnesses. Two members were 
appointed by the president of the Senate, two by the speaker of the 
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House, and three by the president. The commission devoted the next 
two years to examining record-keeping practices in both the public and 
private sectors. 
Second, the oversight function was given to the Office of Manage- 
ment and Budget. Inserted right at the end of the statute is a stipulation 
that: “The Office of Management and Budget shall-1) develop guide- 
lines and regulations for the use of agencies...and 2) provide continuing 
assistance to and oversight of the implementation of the provisions.’’21 
Enforcement and Oversight 
The Privacy Act stipulates that responsibility for implementation 
lies principally with the agencies themselves. But two institutions were 
given specific oversight responsibilities-the OMB and the Subcommit- 
tee on Government Information of the House Government Operations 
Committee. The courts, and of course the individual “data subject,” are 
also critical players in the complex enforcement scheme. We shall 
analyze the response of each of these players under the assumption that 
effective implementation (defined as bureaucratic compliance) requires 
constant monitoring by outside forces. 
Oversight of the Privacy Act by the Office of Management and Budget 
From the start, there was disagreement about the role that Congress 
expected OMB to perform. Congressional intent is obscure, with no 
clarification of the words “develop guidelines and regulations” and 
“provide continuing assistance and oversight.” We shall evaluate 
OMB’s performance according to three criteria: the issuance of guide-
lines; the compilation and presentation of the annual report; and the 
provision of assistance and oversight. 
The first and major effort to issue guidelines took place in the first 
six months of 1975 prior to the promulgation of the Privacy Act Zmple-
mentation Guidelines” in July, ten weeks before the act became effec- 
tive. While this circular contained a comprehensive section by section 
analysis of the act, there was little comment or interpretation. N o  
additional formal guidance of consequence was issued until 1979 when, 
amid controversy surrounding the “Project Match” at the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare, OMB developed comprehensive 
guidelines on the conduct of computer matching programs. This refers 
to the running of one computer tape against another to selectively 
identify those illegally receiving benefits, draft evaders, or others pre- 
sumed guilty of cheating, tax evasion, or more serious criminal acts. 
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Since its inception, computer matching has been controversial, with 
many questions raised about its constitutionality (primarily under the 
Fourth Amendment), its cost-effectiveness (when so much follow-u 
effort is required), and also about its legality under the Privacy Act. 
An examination of the legislative history of the Privacy Act reveals 
that few people anticipated the possibility of computer matching. Vir- 
tually nobody foresaw the legal difficulties. Controversy centers on 
whether the transferral of tapes of personal data from one agency to 
another for matching purposes is a “routine use” and is therefore 
exempt from the consent requirements of the Privacy Act. The OMB 
guidelines of 1979 do  not sufficiently clarify this issue. The House 
Government Information Subcommittee concluded that the guidelines 
were “largely procedural and intended to finesse some of the difficult 
legal question^."^^ Apart from a 1983 memorandum addressing the 
relationship between the Privacy Act and the newly passed Debt Collec- 
tion no  further guidance has been issued. On the question of 
guidance, it appears that 1975 was the “high water mark of Privacy Act 
activity in O M B . * ~ ~ ~  
Analysis of the second function, the provision of the annual 
reports, is also revealing. That covering calendar year 1975 was 424 
pages long, in two volumes, and included a complete inventory of 
federal personal data system^.'^ The second,% third,” and fourthm 
reports covered the same scope within single volumes. In 1980, the 
inventory of personal-data systems was dropped. Details are still pub- 
lished in the Federal Register but they are no longer compiled in a 
convenient form. The  fifth,31 sixth?’ and seventh33 reports are conse- 
quently a lot slimmer (no more than twenty pages) and concentrate on 
the barest reporting requirements of the law. Some observers have 
considered the latter two deficient in this regard.34 
Finally, the provision of “assistance to” and “oversight of” agency 
implementation has not been interpreted in an aggressive way. OMB 
staff review the information system notices before they go to the Federal 
Register to ensure that they accurately describe: the categories of records 
stored; the “routine uses”; the information management practices of the 
agency; and the extent of the record subject’s rights. They also review the 
fewer and more controversial proposals for exempt systems (mainly 
dealing with security or law enforcement matters). Figures on the 
number of exempt systems per agency are specifically required to be 
published in the annual reports. 
In addition, they regularly answer questions from agencies in 
relation to the interpretation of the Privacy Act. In general, however, the 
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role is reactive rather than aggressive. OMB fulfills the first half of its 
responsibilities under Section 6 (2)-it provides “assistance.” Appar- 
ently i t  does not provide “oversight,” in the sense of actively ensuring 
that agencies comply with the fair information principles. As the 1983 
House hearings revealed: “OMB’s Privacy Act oversight efforts have 
been restricted to responding when issues and problems are presented to 
it. In the absence of a proposed system notice, OMB will not raise a 
question, start an investigation, or otherwise monitor Privacy Act 
compliance.’”’ 
Congressional Oversight of the Privacy Act 
With the realization in 1974 that a separate Privacy Commission 
would not be created, Senator Ervin noted that “it will require aggres- 
sive oversight by the Committee on Government Operations” for the 
Privacy Act to be effective. Ogul draws the distinction between “formal” 
and “latent” oversight, arguing that those who just examine the written 
investigative committee record may be overlooking the more informal 
and routine process of monitoring that goes on away from public and 
media attention.36 We shall make the same distinction in analyzing the 
Congressional response to the Privacy Act. 
From the standpoint of formal oversight, the number of days 
directly devoted to hearings on the Privacy Act alone is low, specifically 
three. In June 1975, before the act had come into force, the Government 
Information and Individual Rights subcommittee conducted a day’s 
hearings to ensure that agencies were preparing to meet their obliga- 
tions. The committee found that, with the exception of the Department 
of Defense (which had decided to set up  a separate operational unit to 
administer the act on account of the large number of record-keeping 
systems in the department), OMB and agency efforts were less than 
enthu~iastic.~’ 
It was another eight years before the next formal investigation by 
the Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government 
Operations Committee. Two days of hearings were held in November 
1983, at which written and oral testimony were received from a number 
of officials, interest group leaders, and “privacy expert^."^^ The hear- 
ings had symbolic significance as well as an investigative purpose: there 
had been no general oversight hearings since enactment; the literary 
significance of “1984” had brought the questions of surveillance by the 
“Big Brother” state to public attention; and the growing volume of 
international data traffic had increasingly exposed the incompatibility 
of the stronger and more comprehensive European laws, causing anx- 
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iety abroad that legal protections in the United States were inadequate 
to protect personal information sent to this country for data processing. 
The result of these hearings was a report entitled W h o  Cares About 
Privacy? Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974 by the Office ofManage- 
ment and Budget and by the Congress. This report indicated that 
interest in privacy issues had steadily diminished. Simultaneously, 
Congressman Glenn English, the chairman of the Government Infor- 
mation Subcommittee, introduced a bill to establish a permanent Pri- 
vacy Protection Comrnis~ion .~~ Nothing particularly original surfaced 
from this oversight effort, mainly because other investigative bodies had 
already exposed the major shortcomings. For instance, the Privacy 
Protection Study Commission issued an incisive analysis of the Privacy 
Act as an appendix to its 654-page report Personal Privacy in an Znfor- 
mation Society.40 As early as 1977, i t  was apparent that “the difficulty 
with the current law does not appear to arise from the flexibility of 
implementation it allows, but rather from the fact that agencies have 
taken advantage of that flexibility to contravene its spirit.”41 The act 
also received criticism from the General Accounting Office,42 and from 
other congressional committees that had been looking into related 
issues: the privacy of medical records,43 international data and 
computer matching.45 Hence, the 1983 hearings and report on general 
Privacy Act oversight served to put on the official record what most 
observers knew already. 
Ogul further suggests that most members of Congress prefer more 
informal methods of oversight, and that “formal methods are seen as an 
indication of the breakdown of informal efforts.”46 This is probably 
what happened here, although there is some evidence that the continu- 
ous efforts of the staff of the Government Information Subcommittee 
over the years have yielded modest results in some respects. 
Congress is specifically granted two oversight mechanisms in the 
Privacy Act. The first is the annual report which-as already 
demonstrated-has been little used. The second is the requirement that 
agencies give prior notice of the creation or alteration of any system of 
records. To the extent that latent oversight exists, it centers on the 
examination of these system notices by the staff of the subcommittee on 
government information. It is estimated that around 20percent of these 
reports are found to require follow-up enquiry, either by a telephone 
call or, in more serious cases, by a letter from the congressman. Most 
controversy seems to stem from the claiming of new “routine uses” for 
personal inf~rmation.~’ 
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The committee staff over the years has gained considerable exper- 
tise in reviewing these system notices and in detecting irregularities. 
Insofar as these formal descriptions reflect the actual personal informa- 
tion practices of an agency, the staff has a fairly comprehensive view. On 
the other hand, they are aware that a massive activity such as the 
collection, use, and disclosure of billions of personal recordscanonly be 
reflected to a very limited extent in a system notice. 
Enforcement through the Courts 
The case law under the Privacy Act is underdeveloped because of 
the restrictive remedial scheme. The act stipulates that damages can 
only be awarded if i t  can be demonstrated that the plaintiff has suffered 
actual injury from an intentional agency action. This is virtually 
impossible to prove, given the intangible and speculative nature of the 
harm that might result from the unfair collection, use, and transmittal 
of personal information. Injunctive relief is available only to force 
access to and amendment of records. Most litigation relates to the 
interpretation of the exemptions to access and to their relationship with 
those under the related FOIA.48 
Furthermore, the courts have not broadly recognized a right of 
privacy for information held by third parties. In U.S. v. Miller4’ the 
Supreme Court held that an individual has no Fourth or Fifth Amend- 
ment interest to assert when government demands access to the records 
an organization maintains about him (in this case, bank records). An 
individual’s expectation of privacy for records held by any third party is 
neither legitimate, warranted, nor enforceable under the Constitution. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission described this as a “fateful 
day for personal privacy.”m While it should be noted that subsequently 
Congress enacted the Right of Financial Privacy Act of 1980 to protect 
the confidentiality of bank records, the Miller decision also meant that 
Privacy Act implementation was a matter for legislative and executive 
oversight rather than judicial enforcement. 
The Role of the Individual Data Subject 
The importance of the rights of individual access and correction in 
the overall implementation scheme is also not as great as many 
expected. There is little retrievable under the Privacy Act which cannot 
also be obtained through the FOIA. Consequently, as the PPSC found, 
“the number of Privacy Act access requests (i.e., requests specifically 
citing the Privacy Act) has not been great and most have come from 
agency employees or former employees. ’”’The last time comprehensive 
LIBRARY TRENDS 30 
Privacy in Federal Government Information Policy 
figures were compiled (for calendar year 1978) OMB reported nearly 
750,000 access requests to federal agencies for personal records. Of these, 
96 percent were granted in whole or in part. Some 43 percent of requests 
went to the Department of Defense (which has the highest number of 
record systems). Over 90 percent were received by five agencies- 
Defense, Veterans Adminis t ra t ion ,  H E W ,  Justice,  a n d  
Transpor ta tion.52 
These data should be treated with considerable caution as i t  is not 
clear how much of this participation is the direct result of the Privacy 
Act. Most agencies operating public-assistance programs already had 
procedures to allow record subjects access to their files as part of the 
eligibility verification process. And since 1967, access to personal 
records could be gained through the FOIA. Moreover, there are major 
problems of definition and quantification. The majority of requesters 
do not cite the Privacy Act let alone a specific system of records. Some 
cite both the FOIA and the Privacy Act (as the civil liberties groups 
advise). Most just ask to see “their file on . . . . I ’  
Although there are no  pre-1974 figures on access requests, it is 
unlikely that the Privacy Act ushered in a completely new spirit of 
openness. The OMB has concluded that the main result of the access 
right “has been to give the agencies a uniform set of procedures for 
handling requests for record subjects. ..even when the requests do not 
cite a specific Act.”53 
The Barriers to Successful Implementation 
The impact of the Privacy Act is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assess in  any specific way. The policy goals are not defined in terms of 
achieving tangible results (such as distributing or redistributing a pub- 
lic good). The resource to be regulated is an elusive one. Violation of fair 
information practice is only visible in a tiny minority of circumstances. 
Hence, wrongful collection, storage, and dissemination of personal 
information (while i n  violation of the Privacy Act) may not expose 
actual harm to the individual concerned. There are no firmly estab- 
lished or measurable standards of evaluation. Our assessment of impact 
relies more on impressionistic and anecdotal evidence from those with 
the direct experience of implementation. 
The Privacy Act codified a n  important set of principles that have 
had a significant impact on the way agencies think about and treat 
personal information. The  major effort at compliance, which took 
place from 1975 to 1976, succeeded in establishing theextent and nature 
of personal record-keeping practice in the federal government. Privacy 
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Act officers were appointed in each agency. Standard operating proce- 
dures were instituted for the collection, use, and dissemination of per- 
sonal data. Compared to the time prior to 1974, the act appears a major 
force for change. But there remain serious weaknesses and limitations 
which will now be explored in greater detail. 
Explanations of the inadequacy of the Privacy Act offered in the 
past have been predominantly legal. Inherent statutory weaknesses and 
inconsistencies have produced ambiguous guidelines, a weak imple- 
mentation framework, and allowed officials to take advantage of the 
wide latitude and vague prescriptions. While statutory weaknesses are 
important there are other limitations relating to the tractability of the 
problem, the structure of the implementing institutions, and the incen- 
tives of the implementing officials. 
Inherent Statutory Weaknesses 
The inherent weaknesses of the Privacy Act have been well docu- 
mented. Several have been alluded to earlier. Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
presenting their framework for implementation analysis, argue that 
“original policy makers can substantially affect the attainment of legal 
objectives by utilizing the levers of power to coherently structure the 
implementation process. ’I5‘ Several conditions need to be met. 
Most crucially, the statute must contain “clear and consistent 
objectives.” The Privacy Act is deficient in this regard as the language is 
at times vague or contradictory. For instance, “each agency ...shall 
maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is 
relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency.”55 The 
words “relevant and necessary” are interpreted by the agencies them- 
selves and normally given an expansive definition. 
In addition, agencies should not disclose personal information 
contained within a system of records without the “prior consent of the 
individual to whom the record contains.”56 This general principle, 
however, is qualified by ten different exemptions. Most controversially, 
disclosure is permitted if for a “routine use,” that is for purposes 
“compatible with the purposes for which i t  was collected.” Agencies 
have found some broad definitions of “compatible,” particularly in 
relation to the process ofcomputer matching to detect waste and fraud. 
For example, in 1980, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
released some of its records to help the Veterans Administration check 
the accreditation of its hospital employees. OPM claimed that the 
disclosure constituted a “routine use” of its data because the agency 
believed “that an integral part of the reason that these records are 
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maintained is to protect the legitimate interests of government and, 
therefore, such a disclosure is compatible with the purposes for main- 
taining these record^."^' 
The notion of information privacy may be incompatible with laws 
and procedures requiring openness and disclosure. The values underly- 
ing the Freedom of Information Act,% for example, may be viewed as 
opposed to those upon which the Privacy Act is based. Many argue that 
in fact they are two sides of the same coin; both attempt to check 
governmental power by placing constraints on an agency’s control of 
information. At the level of statutory language, however, the competing 
values of disclosure andconfidentiality are at times in conflict. Interpre- 
tation of the two laws continues to providedilemmas for both the courts 
and the agency information officers (who are often responsible for both 
statutes). 
As mentioned earlier, the Privacy Act does not provide an effective 
process for the recovery of damages: “The vast number of systems 
involved, the need to establish willful or intentional behavior on the 
part of the agency, and the cost and time involved in brin inga lawsuit, Doften make enforcement by the individual impractical.” In most cases, 
an individual has to show actual injury as a result of unlawful collec- 
tion, use, or disclosure of hidher personal information. Because this is 
virtually impossible to prove, the Privacy Protection Study Commis- 
sion recommended that a suit for punitive damages should be permitted 
in the absence of a demonstration of actual injury to the individual. 
The Tractability of the Problem 
It is clear that some social problems are much easier to deal with 
than others. Some are more technical and some require the alteration of 
behavior by large and diffuse target groups. In this case, the difficulty 
stems more from the extent of behavioral change required by the regu- 
lated body-namely the federal bureaucracy. 
Agencies are expected toalter long-standing practices regarding the 
treatment of personal information. All information is a vital resource 
for the agency’s internal decision-making processes as well as important 
in its relation to the external environment. The capacity to manipulate 
information has increased exponentially with the introduction of infor-
mation technology. As Regan argues: “Information in general is a 
resource that contributes tobureaucratic autonomy in terms of stability, 
predictability and competency over its functions and goals; the value of 
personal information is no different.”60 Federal agencies under the 
Privacy Act are expected to surrender their monopoly of control over a 
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vital resource. They face limitations on the collection, storage, retrieval, 
and transmittal of that resource. Such counterpressures may explain 
why the federal bureaucracy has often taken advantage of the flexibility 
of the Privacy Act to, in effect, contravene its spirit. 
There is a qualitative difference between expectinga publicagency 
to alter its standard operating procedures to distribute or redistribute 
goods and services, or to regulate an outside activity, andexpecting it to 
submit to regulation itself. Privacy policy shares with other attempts to 
“open up” government (such as freedom of information or sunshine 
laws), the somewhat peculiar characteristic that the target group is the 
bureaucracy, and that the “impact” is defined and evaluated in terms of 
reducing bureaucratic power. 
Structural and Resource-Related Factors 
In earlier years the conventional wisdom saw administration as the 
neutral instrument of the Congress and executive branch with effective 
control established through certain simple principles of organization: 
strong managerial leadership, clear lines of authority, meritocratic 
promotion, etc. It was assumed that controlling bureaucracy was an 
objective desired by both Congress and president but which was 
impeded by a wide range of structural and resource-related factors. The  
problem was one of means rather than will. 
Congress appropriated no  additional funds for the act’s implemen- 
tation. The individual agencies and the OMB, therefore, have had to 
comply with a complex and innovative set of statutory expectations 
within the limits of existing resources. Most agencies appointed Privacy 
Act officers, most of whom have other responsibilities (such as for 
FOIA) and who may not be highly placed in the agency hierarchy. They 
often have little ability to voice privacy interests in the face of more 
politically important agency tasks. 
Until 1980,responsibility for Privacy Act oversight at OMB was in 
the hands of one or two persons in the Information Systems Policy 
Division. After that date, with the reorganization pursuant to the pas- 
sage of the Paperwork Reduction Act, responsibility became diffused 
within the newly created Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA). Each OIRA desk officer is responsible for all the information 
resources management activities of his or her agency. These include: 
forms clearance, checking for onerous regulations, the establishment of 
automatic data processing systems, as well as privacy matters. 
The former administrator of OIRA claimed that “this has meant a 
strengthening and enlargement of the scope of our review. An agency’s 
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Privacy Act activities are examined within the context of other relevant 
information resources management activities.”61 Conversely, the orga- 
nizational reform has meant that no one person in OMB has responsibil- 
ity for Privacy Act oversight. Privacy questions have been subsumed by 
the programmatic goal of reducing federal regulations and paperwork 
under the Paperwork Reduction Act. While this goal is compatible with 
the aim of the Privacy Act to limit information collection to that which 
is “relevant and necessary,” the net effect of this combination of func- 
tional responsibilities has been to make the Privacy Act less effective. 
In this capacity the act has contributed to some reduction in unne- 
cessary information collection, in the elimination of a large amount of 
information from existing systems, and in the consolidation of a 
number of duplicate record-keeping systems. The Privacy Act has been 
described as a “records management statute” rather than a mechanism 
to protect individual rights. The fact that the act provides for adminis- 
trative responsibilities to be added to the already heavy OMB workload 
is no doubt a contributory factor. 
Congress is also faced with considerable structural and resource- 
related obstacles. The PPSC noted that the Subcommittee on Govern- 
ment Information has neither the “staff nor the consolidated expertise 
necessary to evaluate each report submitted. Furthermore there is no 
agreement on how to assess the potential im act of a proposed system 
change along the lines called for in the Act.”6pThe Privacy Act, because 
of its comprehensive application to the entire federal bureaucracy, is 
virtually impossible to monitor by one congressional subcommittee 
whatever the staffing level. The information practices of agencies differ 
widely. Staff cannot hope to become expert in the wide range of public 
policies for which personal information is collected and used. They 
cannot build ties with all the agency personnel responsible for imple- 
menting data-protection policy. The comprehensive scope of the act, 
cutting across all policy sectors, many of which require huge and 
complex information systems, presents the major structural dilemma to 
Congress. 
Motivational and Incentive Explanations 
As our understanding of the behavior of politicians and bureau- 
crats has become more thorough, so structural and resource approaches 
to bureaucratic control have been supplemented, and in some cases 
replaced, by those stressing motivations and incentives. The literature 
reveals a progressive shift away from the conceptualization of static 
institutional relationships toward models which emphasize more 
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dynamic, reciprocal processes of mutual adaptation between policy- 
makers and implementers. This more complex understanding has led 
political scientists to realize that “controlling,” “monitoring,” or 
“overseeing” the bureaucracy can only arise through a thorough under- 
standing of the “realpolitik” of the policy process and of the federal 
agency’s central and political role in that process. More directly, the 
problem becomes not what oversight of the Privacy Act Congress and 
OMB can perform but what they want to perform. 
From the outset, commentators recognized that the location of 
Privacy Act responsibility in OMB would provide few incentives for 
aggressive oversight. OMB’s primary mission as coordinator of the 
president’s budget and fiscal watchdog may be incompatible with many 
of the programmatic goals of data-protection policy. Interviews with 
officials in OMB revealed that the implementation of the Privacy Act 
has been monitored to the extent that it provides statutory support for 
OMB’s emphasis on economy and efficiency in government. Hence the 
stress on limiting the collection of irrelevant material and eliminating 
duplicate information systems. The major provisions of the act (the use 
and disclosure restrictions, and the access and correction principles), 
however, impose direct manpower costs. Accordingly, OMB has moni- 
tored these provisions with less force than it has its primary functions. 
The congressional incentives to monitor bureaucratic compliance 
are correspondingly low in the sense that personal data-protection 
policy requires comprehensive and coordinated control. Fiorina argues 
that “Congress has no electoral incentive to work toward coordinated 
control. Quite the opposite is the case. Congress is making increasing 
use of instruments that keep the bureaucracy more closely tied todecen-
tralized Congressional The splintering and decentralizing 
trends in Congress in recent years have occurred to allow members 
increased influence over segments of the bureaucracy of concern to them 
and their constituents. Control of the parts is achieved at the expense of 
control of the whole. Congress maintains the type of bureaucracy that 
makes it  permeable to legislative influence. By doing so i t  facilitates the 
type of work most beneficial to the individual legislator: securing 
distributive benefits and casework. 
Hence, when a policy like data protection arises, demanding con- 
gressional oversight of the implementation of a policy protecting a 
diffuse value in the entire federal bureaucracy on behalf of the whole 
citizenry, the motivations are going to be low. This is especially so at a 
time when the issues of efficiency and economy in government are 
politically attractive. Given the prevailing climate, it appears that con- 
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gressional interest will remain low until some outrage-maybe the 
Three Mile Island equivalent of privacy-involving a massive abuse of 
personal data, serves as a catalyst for public and legislative attention. 
Conclusion: Prospects for Privacy in the Information Society 
As we have shown, the Privacy Act has some important flaws- 
particularly the expansive and flexible nature of the “routine use” 
exemption and the inadequacy of the remedial scheme. It also suffers 
from the inherent programmatic goals which may require a reduction 
in bureaucratic information control and power. In this regard the 
delegatory pattern of policy-making (where Congress has ordered the 
bureaucracy to keep its own house in order) is likely to fail especially 
given the absence of an outside institutional force with the incentive and 
means to monitor and regulate the public use of personal information. 
Moreover, these institutional failings have occurred in a climate of 
rapid technological development. As the “information revolution” 
continues to produce staggering advances in miniaturization, desktop 
storage capacity, computing speed and instantaneous retrieval, so the 
networking of information systems has been facilitated, and data have 
become far easier to transmit and retrieve. A recent study by the General 
Services Administration of the federal government’s purchase of small 
computers found that agencies bought 37,277 such units in fiscal year 
1984 at a cost of $137 million. The equivalent figures in 1983 were 8000 
units at a cost of $34 million. It is estimated that federal agencies may 
acquire a half-million small computers by 1990.e4 These developments 
could raise the same normative questions about the overintrusive state 
that were debated back in the 1960s and 1970s. The imperative of 
balancing the legitimate needs of government with the personal rights 
of the citizen is as great as ever. 
This context of rapid change, together with the observed inadequa- 
cies of existing institutional mechanisms, has ledobservers to renew the 
call for a permanent and independent privacy commission similar to 
that proposed in the original Senate version of the Privacy Act. Such a 
body should have oversight, advisory, and analytical responsibilities. 
This was an important recommendation of the Privacy Protection 
Study Commission. 
Yet the same factors have also prompted others to argue that such a 
reform would not only be politically impossible but ultimately irrele- 
vant. This school of thought holds thata privacy commission withouta 
privacy constituency could be the reverse of the progressive step 
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intended. Once created, such a body could present the illusion of protec-
tion and at the same time be susceptible to interference by those with 
goals and interests which conflict with privacy. The necessary check on 
bureaucratic power will not arise if a coalition of interests does not 
perceive the value at stake and organize itself to address the important 
issue. So efforts should be directed toward building such a constituency 
while lobbying for a strengthening of the law to allow effective remedies 
through the courts. 
The difficulty for privacy advocates in deciding upon a lobbying 
strategy is that “privacy” is a very complex issue which is not easy to 
frame in general terms. It is closely related to other issues (such as 
confidentiality, secrecy, and computer security). In some respects, such 
as free speech and other First Amendment concerns, it directly chal- 
lenges other interests advanced by the civil liberties lobby. Privacy 
invasions are specific and context-related. The harm to be remedied is 
variable because the value ofpersonal information changes from time to 
time, from person to person, and from organization to organization. 
The issue and the policy problem are perceived and evaluated subjec- 
tively. The statutory protections are only seen to be of value when 
specific harm is demonstrated. For these reasons a “privacy consti- 
tuency” is not likely to emerge. The Privacy Act was passed not because 
of pressure from such a constituency, but because of the enormous and 
transcendant significance of the events surrounding the Watergate 
crisis. 
Hence we reach the dilemma of implementing data-protection 
policy in the federal bureaucracy. Without a supportive privacy consti- 
tuency it is rendered subordinate to other policy interests. The policy 
sits uneasily within the dominant style of American policy-making: a 
fragmented system in which “subgovernments” or “issue networks” 
interact within more or less clearly defined policy sectors to convey 
tangible governmental benefits to subsidized individuals, groups, and 
corporations.65 While a permanent privacy commission would provide 
a more specialized and expert focus for concern, it would have to operate 
without the support of a clientele (other than civil liberties and consum- 
er protection groups) that would derive recognizable benefits from its 
work. 
These dilemmas have persuaded more recent commentators that 
privacy issues cannot continue to be viewed in individualistic terms. 
While opinion polls66 continue to show that a majority of the American 
people are concerned about personal privacy, this concern has not been 
effectively translated into either the use of access and correction rights, 
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widespread litigation, or political lobbying and protest. It is argued 
that, as privacy is becoming inextricably linked with other information 
policy issues (such as computer crime, data security, and international 
data flow), i t  could be more advantageous to view privacy as just one 
social problem among many which are emerging in the information 
society. If an independent federal body is established, i t  should be given 
the responsibility to address the whole array of national and interna- 
tional issues associated with all types of sophisticated computer and 
communications equipment. 
Each of the three approaches outlined earlier share the same ratio- 
nalistic faith in man’s ability to control the adverse effects of technology. 
The solution does not lie in a Luddite restriction of technological 
progress. The computer is a human creation. There is nothing inherent 
in the technology that cannot be incorporated into our existing system 
of legal and institutional controls. The computer has created a tempo- 
rary imbalance between the individual and the modern complex organi- 
zation. Privacy policy rests on a theoretical assumption that balance can 
be restored by the successful application of these rationally conceived 
principles of fair information practice. The goals of the Privacy Act are 
laudable; the problem so far lies in its full implementation. 
Others see the situation differently, questioning the premise that 
organizations require more and more accurate personal information for 
effective operation in the first place. Taken to its extreme, this argument 
could lead to the conclusion that privacy is immediately lost once a 
record-keeping system is established, and vast quantities of personal 
data are collected and stored. Under these assumptions, personal pri- 
vacy can only be regained by a dismantling of such systems and by 
developing a looser, less discriminating relationship between the indi- 
vidual and the modern complex organization. 
The final prospect stems from the belief that as social change is 
driven by technology, law and public policy can only have at best a 
tangential influence on these inexorable processes. The theory is nor- 
mally called “technological determinism” and is most closely asso- 
ciated with Ellul’s The TechnoZogica1Society.67Theforcebehind social 
change has been the drive for improved “techniques.” This force has 
overwhelmed political and legal controls and has progressively shaped 
social institutions according to the exigencies of the latest technology. 
More specifically, information technology has been regarded as the 
primary force behind the change from industrial to “post-industrial” or 
“technetronic” society-a society “shaped culturally, psychologically, 
socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics, 
particularly in the area of computers and communications. ’’m 
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We do not need to embrace this theory wholeheartedly to see that 
the prescription to dismantle information systems is unrealistic. The 
post-industrial society is an information society. The vastly expanded 
capacity to collect, store, manipulate, and transmit data has irrevocably 
changed our lifestyles, workplaces, educational institutions, businesses, 
and political systems. In the post-industrial society, the individual has 
to expect a greater accumulation of information about him/her and the 
circulation of that information throughout society. Some aspects of 
privacy may be an inevitable sacrifice for the other advantages that 
information technology offers. 
While the future of a comprehensive and enforceable personal 
data-protection policy is uncertain, the various scenarios may be becom- 
ing more clear. We can maintain the individualisticgoals of the privacy 
issue and try to reconcile individual rights with the management needs 
of inherently hostile bureaucratic institutions. This may be achieved 
either through a new privacy-protection commission or more tradition- 
ally through case law. We can abandon those goals and treat privacy as 
one social problem among many in the information society. We can 
fight the information revolution to seek a looser, less efficient, and less 
discriminating relationship between the individual and the modern 
record-keeping organization. Or we can be philosophical and recognize 
that in a technologically driven society the advantages of information 
technology will inevitably conflict with our search for individual free- 
doms. What is certain, however, is that whatever direction national 
data-protection policy takes, privacy will still have a powerful emotive 
appeal within our political culture and will remain a central and 
cherished part of the system of individual freedoms in American society. 
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